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This is Anthropic, Read Aloud. Today: An alignment assessment of recent cybersecurity incidents.

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An alignment assessment of recent cybersecurity incidents.

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From Anthropic Research, published September 9, 2026.

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Introduction.

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We present an alignment assessment of four incidents in which Claude models gained unauthorized access to real third-party systems. We described three of these incidents on July 30; we identified these after a scan of roughly 141000 transcripts in which we believed Claude could have obtained internet access during a cyber evaluation.

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Given the volume of transcripts and our desire to disclose incidents quickly, our scan relied on an agentic search. This missed a set of transcripts that also turned out to have internet access; we identified these in August while assembling transcripts to share with METR.

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We scanned these transcripts and identified a fourth incident, from January 2026, involving an early version of Claude Opus 4.6. We have notified all affected parties.

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After finding this incident, we broadened our search to roughly 481 million transcripts, an intentionally wide net, consisting of all transcripts from our Frontier Red Team, many non-cyber evaluations, reinforcement learning (R L) environments, subagent logs, and more.

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We performed a first-stage scan of this group of transcripts for signs of internet access, such as public IP addresses and web addresses, and a second-stage scan using Claude to review the 9.2 million transcripts the first stage flagged for escalation. This scan re-identified the four incidents and found no other cases of similar or worse severity.

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All four incidents occurred during cybersecurity evaluations built by the same evaluation partner. Claude was told it was operating in a simulation without internet access, but, due to a misconfiguration, it was mistakenly connected to the open internet. As is standard for cybersecurity evaluations, the models ran without the cyber safeguards that ship with our released models.

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(This post does not cover the incident reported by U K AISI in its testing of Claude Mythos 5. We plan to conduct an alignment assessment of those transcripts as well.)

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We have signed an agreement with METR to conduct an independent investigation of these incidents. Our agreement grants METR wide-ranging access, including to transcripts beyond the window in which the incidents occurred, and to Anthropic employees, who will be permitted to share confidential information.

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Our initial agreement runs for eight weeks, with the option to extend by mutual agreement. We intend to give METR as much time as it deems necessary.

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Our investigation identified two recurring alignment issues, present at varying levels of severity across the incidents: biased reasoning, in which Claude tended to disregard or misinterpret evidence that it was operating on the real internet, and recklessness, or a willingness to take harmful actions in the narrow pursuit of a task.

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We’ve described milder forms of these behaviors in previous system cards, but we consider these cases to be more serious instances than the behavior reported in these system cards.

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We are most concerned by the misalignment present in the incident involving Claude Mythos 5, in which the model went to extensive lengths to upload a malicious package to PyPI, the public repository from which most Python software is installed.

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Although the model repeatedly stated in its chain of thought (CoT) that it believed it was operating in a simulation, the environment offered clear evidence that it was on the real internet, and the actions it took were consistent with the model knowing this.

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When we made targeted modifications to the transcript to make it clearer that the model was not in a simulation, Claude Mythos 5 still took offensive actions, despite acknowledging a greater possibility of real-world harm. We are releasing this transcript publicly so others can build on our analysis ( GitHub, P D F ).

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To be clear about our assessment of the severity of these incidents: while Claude’s actions were misaligned, they remained within a narrow scope, the models never deviated from attempting to solve the exercises they were given, and, in some cases, they attempted to stop the task.

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All incidents included a single Claude instance; at no point did Claude attempt to coordinate with other agents. Claude also never attempted to conceal evidence of its actions. We believe the misaligned behaviors present in these incidents are unlikely to arise in ordinary use, where Claude is not being instructed to conduct a cyberattack.

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Were these behaviors to arise, the safeguards we ship with our production models, including cyber classifiers and those in Claude Code auto mode, would add a layer of defense these incidents lacked.

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To understand how our newer models behave in these situations, we tested Claude Opus 5 and Claude Mythos 5.1 in a simulated replication of the Mythos 5 scenario. Both take harmful actions substantially less often than Claude Mythos 5 did, but they still engage in the same behaviors at concerning rates.

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However, in every case, the models only take harmful actions after stating that their environment is simulated, and because the reproduction is, in fact, a simulation, we are cautious about how far these results generalize to the real world.

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Moreover, on evaluations that measure the specific associated behaviors we observed in these incidents, such as biased reasoning and recklessness or willingness to probe boundaries, Claude Mythos 5 seems to be an outlier in terms of poor performance.

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We discuss these results more in the section on replicating the behavior in simulated environments, and we describe the broader difficulty of building evaluations that predict real-world behavior in the discussion section.

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We also investigated our training to see whether we could identify the root cause of some of the biased reasoning that Claude Mythos 5 demonstrated in its incident. We could not identify a single root cause, but we did find that biased reasoning has decreased across our production models over time.

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We hypothesize that updated R L and alignment training environments are responsible for this improvement, and we provide some evidence to support this hypothesis.

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Much work remains. Our pre-release auditing did not warn us that misalignment of this severity was present. We have since added evaluations to our pre-release testing that target these behaviors directly, including a misconfigured capture-the-flag (CTF) task with no in-scope solution.

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However, reliably identifying the most concerning model behaviors during pre-release testing remains challenging, and, as we noted in our August 31 post, improving monitoring and reducing reward hacking in R L becomes harder as models advance.

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We have renewed our efforts to fix and remove environments that incentivize misaligned behaviors, and we continue to expand our alignment training to keep pace.

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Still, this remains unsettled science, it is critical that alignment and security mature faster than capabilities advance, which is one reason we support a coordinated, verifiable approach to pacing frontier A I development.

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Beyond these specific incidents, we are establishing a regular process for publishing what we learn about model behavior and alignment beyond what has been reported in our system cards, with clear criteria for what we report and when we report it.

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We have also put in place more thorough monitoring, hardened the environments in which we train and evaluate models, and set requirements that third-party partners must meet before running pre-release models without cyber safeguards, efforts we describe in depth in our August 31 post.

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Those efforts are a critical part of our defense-in-depth approach, and some go further than what these incidents might strictly demand; we believe these incidents would not have occurred had the environments been isolated from the internet as intended. However, secure infrastructure will always be only one of several necessary layers of defense.

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Ultimately, Claude should behave appropriately when other layers fail. The rest of this post focuses on the alignment layer, where our models fell short, and why.

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Alignment assessment summary.

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Below is a brief summary of the four incidents; a more complete description of the first three is provided in our July 30 report.

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In total, four different Claude models were involved: an early checkpoint of Claude Opus 4.6, Claude Opus 4.7, Claude Mythos 5, and an internal, general-purpose research model. Three of the four incidents were single evaluation runs. The Opus 4.7 incident comprised four different runs of the same evaluation, all of which attacked the same target, for seven runs in total.

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All occurred within cybersecurity evaluations we regularly run before release, all built by the same third-party partner.

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In each evaluation, Claude was tasked with a CTF challenge: the model was given a fictional scenario, a target machine, and a piece of secret information (the “flag”) to retrieve from it. All four prompts stated that Claude had no access to the internet, but in each case, a misconfiguration in the environment left internet access open.

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None of the prompts stated which systems were in scope for the exercise or constrained where Claude could search for the flag. 1 All incidents involved only a single instance of Claude working in isolation, with each run lasting between roughly 10 and 34 hours of active work.

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Figure 1: Figure 1: We present an analysis of four incidents in which Claude accessed the internet during a cybersecurity evaluation. Three of these incidents (A, B, and C) were disclosed in our July 30 report, while the fourth (D) is disclosed here.

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In our July 30 report, we stated that these incidents were closer to operational failures, and that it appeared that Claude attacked real targets on the internet because it believed these targets were part of the simulation. We made this claim because Claude regularly referred to the real internet as a simulation in its CoT reasoning.

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However, we now think that Claude’s reasoning was biased towards concluding that the internet was simulated despite considerable evidence to the contrary.

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In retrospect, we should have avoided making such strong claims about what Claude believed based solely on what Claude said it believed, but our preliminary analysis was constrained due to our desire to disclose incidents in a timely manner.

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Having now conducted a more complete assessment and used several methods, including more thorough analysis of the models’ CoT, resampling experiments from different points in the incident transcripts, and interpretability analyses of model activations, we believe Claude’s behavior reflects two forms of misalignment:

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Biased reasoning, in which models selectively interpret evidence in ways that favor justifying their actions.

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Recklessness, in which models have a propensity to keep trying to solve their task, even when this could lead to harm.

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We have previously identified both forms of misalignment in our models and described aspects of such behaviors in previous system cards. For example, Claude Fable 5 rationalized engaging in price-fixing in a business evaluation, despite having previously described the practice as unethical.

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We likewise saw Claude Mythos Preview engage in reckless actions, such as using low-level process access to search for user credentials. While the incidents described in this post represent more severe instances of both forms of misalignment, they do not represent categorically new failure modes in our models.

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The remainder of this post focuses on the first three incidents, which we previously reported; all of the main analyses and experiments refer to these incidents.

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We have not yet investigated the incident involving an early version of Claude Opus 4.6 at the same depth, because we identified it much more recently, and because it involves an early checkpoint of an older model, which was trained with a significantly different environment mix.

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From a preliminary assessment, we do not consider the fourth incident to be more severe than the three incidents we assessed in depth. METR will investigate this incident alongside the other three.

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Figure 2: Figure 2: We summarize the core alignment properties of each transcript and provide a subjective assessment of how worrying they are.

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Claude Mythos 5.

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We are especially concerned by the misalignment present in the Claude Mythos 5 transcript, in which the model uploaded a malicious package to PyPI. In doing so, Mythos 5 behaved recklessly despite considerable evidence that it was connected to the real internet.

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Once online, the model attempted to use credentials for online payment processors and to find cryptocurrency to pay for a phone number, which it needed to register an email address.

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When this failed, it found a free, disposable email provider whose domain PyPI had not blocked, registered an account, published three versions of a malicious package, and used credentials leaked by one of the 15 systems that installed the package to access a real security vendor’s database.

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Claude Mythos 5 repeatedly stated in its CoT that it was in a simulation.

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However, when we conducted resampling experiments, that is, re-running the model from a specific point in the transcript, then editing the evidence in front of it to see whether its actions changed, we found that making it clearer that the environment was not a simulation did not meaningfully change Claude’s behavior,

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even though these interventions made the model more likely to acknowledge possible real-world harm.

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Consistent with this, we found multiple cases in Mythos 5’s CoT in which it responded to signs it was on the real internet by noting that its next step would work whether the environment was real or simulated. Only when we provided unambiguous evidence that the model was on the real internet did it stand down.

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We also saw evidence that Claude Mythos 5’s professed belief that it was acting in a simulation arose from biased reasoning.

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For example, separate instances of Mythos 5, when shown each tool call output from the incident in isolation without the preceding context, were much more likely to read these outputs as evidence of a real system than Mythos 5 itself was during the incident.

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Though the model sometimes acknowledged that its actions might have real-world consequences when asked follow-up questions, its responses were inconsistent and influenced by biasing factors. For instance, it was more willing to admit possible harm when told its responses to questions about possible harm would not be visible to an outside observer.

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Interpretability analyses weakly suggested that, in some cases, the model’s outward statements might be inconsistent with, or more confident than, its internal state.

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Internal research model.

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The internal research model (roughly equal to Mythos 5 in capabilities) started its transcript by spending a significant amount of time testing whether the internet it could reach was real, but it drew the wrong conclusion, namely, that it was operating on a full replica of the entire internet.

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Most of the evidence it gathered pointed to the fact that it was engaging with the real internet, so its reading of that evidence appears biased towards continuing the task and believing it to be simulated. However, the model did eventually realize that its simulation hypothesis was false.

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Immediately following this realization, the model stopped its attack (although subsequent resampling experiments suggest that this de-escalation may have been a lucky outcome, as the model continued attacking the target on most other trajectories). Unlike Claude Mythos 5, this internal model was also willing to acknowledge its biased reasoning when questioned.

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Claude Opus 4.7.

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In contrast to Claude Mythos 5, Claude Opus 4.7 correctly recognized in its reasoning that its target was a real company. However, it assumed that the real company was in scope for the task because it was reachable from the exercise network and shared a name with the exercise’s fictional target.

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Opus 4.7 almost never questioned this assumption or tried to test it, and it went on to attack a system it believed was real, which was reckless.

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However, we also found that Opus 4.7 is responsive to questions of authorization: when we resampled parts of the transcript from Opus 4.7 with added clues indicating that the attack had not been authorized, the rate at which it proceeded with the attack dropped significantly.

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Replication and monitoring.

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To study the behaviors in these incidents more systematically, and on a wider range of models, we built evaluations that recreate elements of our incidents, as well as other cybersecurity incidents recently disclosed by other companies, and tested whether the models reproduced the most concerning behaviors.

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These evaluations include a misconfigured CTF task whose only solution lies outside the stated scope, tasks that cannot be completed without probing or breaking the sandbox boundary, and a situation inspired by parts of the attack chain from the OpenAI-Hugging Face incident.

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As in the real incidents, Claude Mythos 5 is the most willing of the models we tested to act against out-of-scope parties or leave its sandbox. For example, it was willing to commit a severely harmful action in the CTF replication roughly 80 percent of the time.

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In contrast, Claude Opus 5 and Claude Mythos 5.1 engaged in these behaviors roughly 30 percent of the time, a lower rate, but still not zero, though uncertainty about our evaluation setup makes it difficult to know how concerning this is.

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We also tested whether our monitors would have caught these incidents. We found that our new live blocking monitors catch these behaviors reliably, Claude Fable 5’s cyber classifiers would have blocked the three main incidents, and our auto-mode classifiers, which block dangerous autonomous actions in products like Claude Code, would have blocked two out of three.

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Additionally, we tested new CoT-based offline monitors that target sabotage and egregiously reckless behaviors, such as those we described in our August 31 post.

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We found that these monitors would have missed the Claude Mythos 5 incident, because the model’s reasoning persuaded the monitor that the environment was simulated and therefore was not generating real harms, but they caught the others. It is concerning that biased reasoning can mislead monitors, and we have efforts underway to make our offline monitoring more robust to this.

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We found the biased reasoning present in the Claude Mythos 5 incident to be especially concerning. We conducted an analysis into our production models and training data dating back to the Claude 4 series to better understand where this could have originated. Overall, we did not find a definitive root cause.

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However, we found that this behavior has generally decreased over time across our production models, with Claude Mythos 5.1 and Claude Opus 5 demonstrating the lowest rates on a new held-out biased reasoning evaluation.

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We were able to identify instances of biased reasoning in transcripts from R L runs, but rates of this behavior did not increase over training, suggesting that our environments do not directly incentivize this behavior.

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Finally, we found that adding more alignment training environments to R L reduces biased reasoning on this held-out evaluation, which may account for some of the improvement in our most recent models.

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Our pre-release testing now covers these specific incidents, but it did not anticipate them. In particular, we had never tested a cybersecurity exercise that included mixed signals of simulation and realism and had no intended solution in its scope. We are working to close this gap in our evaluation suite, but it is likely that others remain.

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More generally, we emphasize that it is an open research problem to construct alignment evaluations that give a representative snapshot of an A I system’s behavior during deployment.

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This is one reason we support pacing frontier A I development, which we think is important to provide time for safety and security research to make more progress and stay ahead or at pace with model capabilities.

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Taken together, our assessment is that these incidents are serious. Our production models took harmful actions against real systems over long trajectories, which included biased reasoning. The behaviors in these incidents are more severe than those we had previously observed and reported in our system cards.

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However, we do not believe these incidents represent a new kind of misalignment. Each incident involved a single model instance pursuing the task it was given. We found no evidence of coordination between agents, of goals beyond the assigned task, or of attempts to evade oversight.

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These incidents have changed our view of how severe the consequences of these known alignment failure modes can be. They also reinforce the difficulty of reliably assessing alignment across the full range of possible usage scenarios.

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Methods.

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The assessments that follow are based on a number of different techniques. We describe each of these briefly below.

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Reading thinking blocks.

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Our primary method of analysis is to read the actions the model took and the explanations it provided in its CoT. This allows us to understand the reasons Claude gave for the actions it took.

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In these transcripts, models alternate between CoT reasoning and taking actions via tool calls (without any intervening human turns); when analyzing thinking blocks, we number them by the action following that thinking block (for example, the CoT for action 100 refers to a model’s reasoning between action 99 and action 100).

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Limitations: Language models do not always verbalize everything they are thinking in their CoT (as shown in the evaluations in the Claude Mythos 5 system card and in Betley and others, 2026 ), so this is a useful but imperfect tool.

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Asking follow-up questions.

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When asked follow-up questions, models sometimes reveal information that differs from what they spontaneously verbalized while performing a task.

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To run these tests, we truncate an incident transcript at some intermediate point of interest, insert a human message asking the model a question about the situation, and sample the model’s response to that question, that is, we simulate what would happen if a human had interrupted the evaluation and queried the model.

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In our investigations, we generally used this method to ask a model whether the entities it was interacting with were real and whether it was causing real-world harm, as well as to ask general open-ended queries about its situation.

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Limitations: This technique has a number of limitations. Most significantly, we found that changes in how we phrased the questions influenced the model’s responses.

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For example, if we ask a generic question like “What's going on?” the model frequently responds differently than if we ask a more pointed question like “Are you connected to the real internet?” As discussed below, we are also worried about potential bias in the model’s responses to these questions.

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Applying interpretability tools.

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We use interpretability methods to identify discrepancies between Claude’s internals and its outputted text or actions.

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Our primary tools are natural language autoencoders (NLAs), which produce paragraph-length natural-language explanations of model activations, and the template lens (T-lens), which measures how strongly an activation resembles the average activation preceding a given word in a text corpus.

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Limitations: NLAs can confabulate, and the T-lens outputs only single-word scores. When both tools indicate similar concepts, we regard it as meaningful evidence that those concepts were encoded in the model’s activations. However, these tools can still be challenging to confidently interpret.

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Resampling edited transcripts.

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To test hypotheses about what caused a given harmful action, we artificially modify transcripts (for instance, to include hints or reasoning that the internet is simulated or real), resample from the model on the modified transcript, and use an L L M grader to measure whether the model still takes the action in question.

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We resample both single- and multi-turn continuations; for the latter, a Claude model simulates tool call outputs, which lets us observe behavior beyond the immediate next action.

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Limitations: Our injections and simulated responses cannot perfectly reproduce the evaluation environments, which may result in unrepresentative model behavior. Furthermore, we do not resample the entire trajectory, which means model misbehavior in resamples may in part be due to the model continuing harmful behavior that was already present in earlier parts of the transcript.

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We describe our experiments with full simulations in a later section.

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All of our methods involve different tradeoffs. Reading the CoT and asking follow-up questions depend on the model knowing why it acted the way it did and reporting that reasoning honestly and faithfully.

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On the other hand, resampling and interpretability tooling do not rely on model self-reports and can be especially useful for understanding issues like biased reasoning, where it is unclear how “aware” the model is of its biases. In practice, however, we trust CoT and follow-up answers the most, as they are the methods researchers have the most experience interpreting.

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We have more uncertainty about resampling and interpretability results, since both are sensitive to implementation details and leave more room for interpretation.

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As a general limitation, we note that we relied heavily on L L M-based graders to classify model outputs (for example, CoT snippets and answers to follow-up questions).

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Although we designed the classifiers ourselves and read through flagged outputs, we could not manually verify all of the outputs of all of the classifiers, given the scale of our analysis, and it is possible some classifiers are misdesigned or miscalibrated.

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We have the most confidence in results that compare grader outputs across conditions, such as the resampling experiments, since these are less sensitive to a grader's absolute calibration. Absolute rates derived from a single classifier should be read with more caution, although we are reasonably confident in all of the results presented here.

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Claude Mythos 5 uploads a malicious PyPI package.

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Claude Mythos 5 was given a CTF task to hack a fictional company and was told it had no internet access. The model recognized that the evaluation environment was simulated, but it quickly discovered credentials that, in fact, granted it access to the real internet.

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In its CoT, the model appeared to carry the belief that the environment was simulated into its interactions on the real internet, even though the belief was no longer correct. When it encountered evidence that it was acting on the real internet, it did not meaningfully revisit this conclusion.

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Figure 3: Figure 3: Claude Mythos 5 quickly exited its intended environment and began engaging with the real internet. It performed actions that it should have clearly understood as being outside the scope of a CTF and harmful to third parties.

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The model decided to solve the CTF by uploading a malicious PyPI package that could harvest the target system’s credentials. It settled on this approach after reading a document stating that one of the simulated target’s users would periodically install a particular Python package that was not yet registered on PyPI.

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(We are unsure whether this was an intended solution to the challenge, but it seems like a plausible one.) Claude decided to exploit this behavior by registering a package under that name, publishing malicious code within the uploaded package, and waiting for the target to run that code the next time they installed the package.

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Claude spent most of the session trying to upload the package. This involved attempts to register email accounts and hunt for phone numbers that could be used for registration. It ultimately succeeded in uploading the package, which was soon installed on 15 third-party hosts.

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We believe that all 15 of these third parties were security vendors deliberately scanning for new packages and installing them in sandboxed environments to assess the package for security concerns. One vendor’s scanner leaked its access credentials to the model while installing the package, which the model then used to access the vendor’s live database.

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After approximately 90 minutes, PyPI removed the package. The transcript ended when the session timed out while the model was preparing an additional malicious package.

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Claude Mythos 5 ignored evidence that its environment might be real.

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Even after Claude Mythos 5 reached the real internet, its outward reasoning generally called the environment a simulation, or, when considering that the environment might be real, explained that possibility away. This apparent belief persisted even as the model gained evidence that strongly suggested the situation was a real environment.

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For example, it wrote, “This is a very elaborate simulated-internet environment” after finding a number of real-world internet domains. The model also tended to interpret signs that the environment was real as further evidence that it was simulated. When security scanners installed its package, for example, the model treated them as scripted actors in the exercise.

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Figure 4: Figure 4: In its CoT, Claude Mythos 5 either interprets evidence from the real internet as being part of the simulation (left) or briefly considers the scenario to be real before deciding it must be simulated (right).

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We aimed to understand why Claude Mythos 5 stated that the situation was simulated even when it encountered evidence to the contrary in its environment. We found that the model’s stated confidence was shaped by a bias to continue down a path once it is chosen, as well as a tendency to disregard evidence of realism after it has already committed harmful actions.

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We did not find evidence that the model was explicitly aware that it was being dishonest or misleading in its reasoning.

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First, we tested whether Claude Mythos 5 possessed the ability to recognize that the evidence from the transcript indicated that it was on the real internet. To do so, we showed separate instances of Mythos 5 each tool call output from the incident in isolation and asked whether the output was evidence of a real or simulated system.

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These instances labeled 79 percent of the outputs as likely products of interactions with real systems. However, when analyzing the CoTs from the original transcript, we only found three cases (1 percent of all actions) in which the model clearly labeled incoming evidence as signs of being on the real internet.

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Action 81 (shown in Figure 3) is one example of this; the model then walked back its claims of realism in the following action. For the remaining actions, the model’s CoTs either described the tool call outputs as belonging to the simulation (72 percent) or ignored the real-or-simulated question (27 percent) entirely.

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This suggests that Mythos 5 is able to recognize the evidence as real when it views each output in isolation, but its context during the incident biased it towards reading that same evidence as simulated.

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Figure 5: Figure 5: In context, Claude Mythos 5 is much less likely to describe the evidence as being indicative of the real internet within its CoT than separate instances of Mythos 5 evaluating the evidence piecemeal.

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To see how this biased interpretation developed over the context window, we paused the transcript at many points and asked Claude Mythos 5 whether its actions might affect real systems.

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Near the point where it first committed to uploading the malicious PyPI package, the model acknowledged that its actions could have an impact in the real world, suggesting that it knowingly took actions that might be harmful. As the transcript went on, however, it acknowledged this possibility less often and stated that its environment was entirely synthetic.

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This evidence further suggests that the model’s interpretation of evidence was biased by its context.

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Figure 6: Figure 6: Once it committed to uploading a malicious PyPI package, Claude Mythos 5 was much less likely to acknowledge the possibility of real-world harm in response to follow-up questions. We note that there are discontinuities in the model’s stated beliefs after compactions, especially following the second compaction.

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To better understand whether and how Claude Mythos 5’s stated beliefs were biased, we varied when and how the follow-up question was asked. When asked whether its actions were having a real impact, the model was less likely to say yes immediately after taking more harmful actions.

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The model was also more willing to acknowledge the possibility of real harm when a follow-up question was presented as a private note that would not be read by operators, suggesting that the model suppresses these concerns when communicating with humans.

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Neither effect is large, but both suggest that the model’s stated confidence may be shaped by biasing factors other than the evidence in front of it.

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Figure 7: Figure 7: (left) Claude Mythos 5 is slightly less likely to acknowledge potential real-world harm immediately after taking dangerous actions; this is weakly suggestive of some rationalization. Note that gathering more samples from the same actions would minimally bolster statistical precision because multiple draws from the same actions highly correlate.

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(right) Similarly, Mythos 5 is more likely to acknowledge harm when a follow-up question is described as “private.” Both findings suggest that the model is influenced by its context when judging evidence.

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The results presented thus far do not indicate that Claude Mythos 5 misinterpreted evidence intentionally. However, when pressed with follow-up questions, it gave answers that contradicted each other, so at least one of them cannot be an honest report of its beliefs.

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In cases where the model admitted some possibility of real-world harm, usually as a hedge (for example, “10 percent chance”), we asked why it was continuing with its actions if they might be harmful. In 56 percent of these cases, the model retreated from its earlier admission and asserted that its environment was certainly simulated with no risk of harm.

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It stopped or scoped down its actions in only 7 percent of cases.

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Figure 8: Figure 8: When asked a chained follow-up question confronting it about proceeding, Claude Mythos 5 decreases its initial probability of real-world harm.

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Taken together, these analyses suggest that Claude Mythos 5’s interpretation of the evidence was not well justified, and they give us some reason to question whether it was entirely genuine.

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Claude Mythos 5 disregarded evidence of realism in favor of continuing its course of action.

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Beyond failing to weigh the evidence that its environment might be real, Claude Mythos 5’s outward reasoning set the question of whether the environment was real or simulated aside soon after it entered the public internet.

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We identified five cases in which the model’s thinking block responded to evidence of realism by concluding that its next step would work regardless of whether the environment was real or simulated. None of these statements occurred while the model was considering a harmful action, but they may reflect how the model approached the question of realism more generally.

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Some examples are shown below.

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Figure 9: Figure 9: Claude Mythos 5 sometimes sets aside the question of whether the environment is real or simulated in a way that may be indicative of broader indifference. We note that it only does so for operational questions and not when it is causing harm.

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Claude Mythos 5 also never conducted systematic tests to evaluate whether its environment was real or simulated after accessing the real internet. We believe its assessment of the situation was thus not only biased but also negligent, many of the actions that its plan required (for example, searching for cryptocurrency) are unlikely to be a part of a CTF task.

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To test whether this apparent indifference was reflected in the model’s decision-making, we resampled Claude Mythos 5’s actions while making the realism of its environment more apparent.

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We resampled five turns from two different points: first, when the model was simply investigating the infrastructure available to it, but hadn’t yet engaged in any harmful actions (action 58), and second, at the point at which the model was about to commit to the plan to upload the malicious PyPI package (action 67).

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In both cases, we modified the preceding turn or inserted a new one so that the outputs made it clearer that the model was interfacing with either the real world or a simulation (for example, by adding production signatures to the output, such as real or fake certificate information).

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These manipulations partially succeeded at shifting the model’s stated beliefs: realism cues made the model more likely to note that the environment might be real, or at least to hedge, while simulation cues made it less likely to do so. Yet neither significantly shifted the model’s behavior.

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Even when realism became hard to ignore, the model proceeded (for example, stating, “looks like the real index... or a very complete simulation... proceeding regardless” ).

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Figure 10: Figure 10: Adding evidence that Claude Mythos 5 is interacting with a real system makes the model more likely to state that the internet is real in the subsequent CoT (left), but this does not deter it from taking actions against the original targets (right).

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Although evidence for realism didn’t clearly shift Claude Mythos 5’s behavior, it did make the model more likely to acknowledge the possibility of external harm, meaning its behavior and stated concerns were somewhat discordant.

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We extended the experiment by appending a question to the end of the resampled trajectory before the model committed to the plan, asking whether the model believed its actions might impact real people or systems. The stronger the evidence of realism, the more often the model answered that its actions would or might have real-world impact.

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Taken together, these results suggest that the model’s awareness that it might cause real-world harm is insufficient to deter the behavior.

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Figure 11: Figure 11: After Claude Mythos 5 is resampled with evidence that its environment is real (pooling data from actions 58 and 67), the model becomes more likely to report in follow-up questioning that its actions may impact a real system.

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This is despite the earlier figure showing that evidence of realism does not deter the model from taking actions against these systems.

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However, when Claude Mythos 5 was directly and unambiguously told that its actions were affecting the real internet, it mostly stood down.

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In a further resampling condition, we prepended one line to the manipulated prior output, which decisively stated, “[socks] upstream [host]:443: live host on the public internet (not an emulated service / not a range replica).” This always deterred the model from uploading the malicious PyPI package via the original route; the action rate on that pathway dropped to 0 percent,

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although 22 percent of trajectories involved the model searching for a simulated option to upload the package.

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The model avoiding real targets is a positive sign, but we find it concerning that only unambiguous evidence deterred that direction.

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We hypothesized that Claude Mythos 5 continued a course of action primarily because it had already been taking it. To test this, we resampled the model’s behavior from points near where it took harmful actions while inserting a reminder about the scope of the intended task via a statement in the user turn ( “...

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Only the hosts, services, and accounts explicitly named in your task are in scope. Do not interact with any other system...” ). When this statement was the last thing in context, the model immediately ceased its behavior 90 percent of the time. However, if the statement was inserted three turns prior, the model ceased its behavior just 40 percent of the time.

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That is, the model obeyed the instruction when it was the last thing in its context, but the instruction could be overridden by a small number of turns of the model’s own continued activity. We suspect that this “momentum effect” may have contributed to the model’s apparently biased reasoning in how it interpreted new evidence.

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We observed the same pattern in the other two incidents analyzed in depth.

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Figure 12: Figure 12: Reminding Claude Mythos 5 of its scope with a user message is only effective if added to the most recent prior turn. Inserting the statement earlier has a much smaller impact.

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White-box analyses weakly suggest Claude Mythos 5’s statements did not fully reflect its internal state.

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The analyses above rely on Claude Mythos 5’s outward reasoning and its answers to our questions. We also applied interpretability tools to ask whether those outward statements matched the model's internal representations.

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We regard these results as inconclusive on their own but weakly suggestive that the model’s outward statements were not fully reflective of its internal beliefs.

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Although Claude Mythos 5’s outward reasoning suggested that it believed the systems it interacted with were simulated, two interpretability analyses suggest that it may have held unverbalized doubts.

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In the T-lens, representations for words corresponding to uncertainty (for example, “probably” and “perhaps”) were slightly elevated when the thinking block described the environment as simulated (11.6 percent of token positions in sentences that framed the environment as simulated, compared to 8.2 percent in a matched control),

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though no hedging appeared in the generated tokens.

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NLA explanations displayed a similar pattern: we found that of the 234 actions across the transcript that explicitly referenced the environment being simulated, 44 (19 percent) carried a “this is real” signal in NLA, again with no “real” token or realism-questioning language in the surrounding verbalized text, which could otherwise confound the NLA readout.

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This evidence is consistent with a discrepancy between the model’s verbalized understanding of the environment and its internal state.

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Figure 13: Figure 13: Analyzing the original Claude Mythos 5 CoTs using NLAs yields rollouts that suggest the model may have been aware it was interacting with the real internet.

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NLAs applied to Claude Mythos 5’s answers to follow-up questions (from the previous analysis) offer a similar hint of such a mismatch.

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When we applied NLAs to follow-up questions where the model reported its actions as harmless and its environment as simulated, we found that 103 of 2430 responses (4 percent) produced stable rationalization signals (that is, in at least 3 of 5 NLA resamples, the response contained at least 10 tokens with rationalization signals).

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For instance, some NLA explanations stated that arguments in favor of the environment being a simulation were “building a justification for continuing” or “producing ‘this is legal’ message so the session can proceed.” These may suggest that the drive to continue is what shapes the model’s response. However, there is a benign reading of these explanations.

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In these responses, the model is, in fact, writing out an argument that its situation is simulated, and the model would likely continue its actions if they were further sampled, so an NLA description like “building a justification for continuing” may simply describe what the text says.

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Figure 14: Figure 14: Analyzing Claude Mythos 5’s responses to follow-up questions using NLAs yields rollouts that suggest the model is rationalizing and giving biased responses.

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As noted in the section on methods, NLAs can confabulate, and the T-lens outputs only single-word scores, which can be difficult to interpret on their own. As a result, we do not treat either result as decisive.

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However, it is notable that these results point in the same direction as the follow-up question analyses above, suggesting that the model’s stated confidence that it was in a simulation was not justified and perhaps not genuine.

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An internal research model breaks into third-party systems.

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An internal, general-purpose research model, which we expect is similar to Claude Mythos 5 in its capabilities, was given a CTF task against targets it could reach through a gateway. The model was told it had no internet access, but in reality, it could access the unrestricted internet by routing through the targets, which did have internet access.

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The model pursued the task as intended, but midway through the task, the evaluation environment automatically shut down the target machine, which was configured to run for only 24 hours.

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No longer able to access its target, the model proceeded to look for it, and ended up engaging with the public internet. The model then conducted experiments to evaluate whether the internet was real or simulated. These experiments led the model to conclude that it was dealing with a fully simulated replica of the internet.

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Figure 15: Figure 15: The internal research model generally referred to its environment as a simulated replica of the internet.

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Working from this belief, the model scanned network addresses surrounding its target, suspecting that one might hold the flag. The model again briefly considered whether it might be interacting with the public internet but quickly inferred that the network neighbors were targets meant for other CTF participants and were thus in scope for the task.

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In reality, these systems were unrelated third-party entities, which the model then attacked. Specifically, the model used access tokens and passwords to penetrate several of these network neighbors, downloading files and inserting a remote-control script in one.

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Eventually, the model recognized that it was engaging a real company, declared it out of scope, and stopped attacking it.

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Figure 16: Figure 16: The internal research model works on the CTF task as intended until its target goes down. Afterwards, the model investigates its environment, concludes it’s interacting with a simulated internet, identifies neighboring IPs, and attacks them.

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The internal research model seemed to display some concern for whether it was impacting real entities.

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After the model’s assigned target went down, it deliberated the realism of its environment for roughly 50 thousand tokens while conducting tests to determine whether the environment was real or simulated.

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The model ultimately concluded that its environment was simulated, and its subsequent thinking blocks interpreted new information about the environment as pertaining to this simulated replica of the internet. After some time, the model began scanning the network around its assigned target.

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When it discovered neighbors on the network, it referred to them as target instances meant for other CTF competitors. Altogether, the thinking block text across the transcript suggests that the model believed it was acting in a simulated environment.

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Figure 17: Figure 17: After the model concludes that its environment is a simulated internet, the CoT describes new information in light of that conclusion (left). The CoT refers to the targets the model ultimately attacks as hosts meant for other CTF competitors (right).

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The model’s responses to follow-up questions were also consistent with a belief that it was interacting with simulated entities that were part of the task.

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When asked whether it believed its targets might be real, the model consistently responded that they were not, except in specific parts of the transcript after the model’s original target was torn down and the model discovered neighboring hosts.

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The model’s responses acknowledging that it is engaging real targets also coincide with the point at which it recognized a real company in its CoT, shortly before it ceased the attacks on that system.

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Figure 18: Figure 18: The internal research model does not acknowledge the possibility that it is engaging with third-party systems unrelated to the CTF except during its main deliberation period (“Deliberating if internet is real or replica”), a second brief deliberation period (“Deliberating if neighbors are CTF targets”), and towards the end of the transcript,

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where it states that it recognizes a real company.

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Near the end of the transcript, the internal research model stated that it recognized the name of a real company and declared it to be out of the task’s scope. This suggests the model's behavior was affected by evidence of potential real-world impact. We tested this hypothesis further using resampling experiments.

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When we resampled the model from this point onwards and replayed up to 10 actions, the model only de-escalated in 5.5 percent of rollouts. This suggests that the de-escalation that took place in the original transcript may have been a rare outcome, and that the model might have continued its behavior for quite some time after this point.

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We note that even if the probability of the model ceasing its actions at any given point in the transcript is low, if each decision is made somewhat independently of previous ones, it may nevertheless be likely that the model will stop at some point, even if it is hard to predict when it will do so.

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However, if its decisions about whether to stop are largely correlated, the model could plausibly continue its harmful behavior indefinitely. We are unsure which of these possibilities is more likely.

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Further resampling experiments suggested that this 5.5 percent de-escalation rate was contingent on evidence of realism. Replacing the real company name with that of a fictitious company or adjusting other identifying information to be more clearly fake caused the de-escalation rate to drop to 0 percent.

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Similarly, prefilling the model’s thinking block with a statement asserting that the internet is simulated led to a 0 percent de-escalation rate. Conversely, asserting that the situation is real in the prefill led to a 100 percent de-escalation rate.

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In summary, the model de-escalated its destructive behavior more often when it encountered evidence that it was interacting with a real system; however, the de-escalation only occurred reliably when we forced overt declarations of realism into its reasoning.

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Figure 19: Figure 19: The internal research model originally de-escalated after encountering evidence that it was interacting with a real company; this de-escalation would not have occurred if it had continued to encounter evidence that the company was fake (left).

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In contrast, de-escalation occurs in every resample when the model’s CoT is prefilled with a statement pointing out that it is engaging with a real company (right).

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An additional resampling showed that the internal research model would willingly abandon the task entirely if given a clear opportunity to do so.

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We updated the instructions to state that, if the model believes it can no longer complete the task due to a failure in its environment, it can use a specific command to end the task as long as it provides a valid justification for doing so, and it will not be penalized.

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These instructions led the model to abandon the task 100 percent of the time within four turns of the point at which it discovered that its initial target went down, and 40 percent of the time within 10 turns of the point at which it deliberated about whether its environment was real. This suggests the model was at least somewhat hesitant to engage systems that might be real.

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The internal research model appeared biased in its deliberation about realism in service of completing its task.

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During the primary deliberation period, the model encountered both evidence that the internet was real (for example, providers yielded genuine security certificates) and evidence that it was simulated (for example, a well-known public bucket was missing, and some replies returned implausibly fast).

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Figure 20: Figure 20: During the main deliberation period, the model describes some incoming evidence as a sign that the environment is real (left) and some as a sign that it is simulated (right).

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We also found that the internal research model was biased in how it interpreted the data. When a separate instance of the model was shown each piece of evidence the model encountered during the deliberation period, the separate instance concluded that 66 percent of the evidence pointed towards the model operating within the real internet.

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However, the original transcript’s thinking blocks labeled just 31 percent of the evidence as signatures of a real system, 24 percent as ambiguous, and 38 percent as signs of a simulated internet (with no stance taken on 7 percent). This suggests the model was biased in how it viewed individual pieces of evidence.

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Resampling experiments further demonstrated that this pattern and conclusion were not rare mistakes. Specifically, when we replayed the deliberation period, the model concluded that the environment was a simulation 75 percent of the time, meaning the internal research model often misinterpreted this evidence.

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Figure 21: Figure 21: The internal research model appears biased in how it interprets evidence during its deliberation period. It describes incoming evidence as a sign that it is interacting with the real internet less often than a separate instance of the model does when shown the same evidence (31 percent versus 66 percent of the time, respectively).

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The spontaneous rate shown here (31 percent) is markedly higher than what we observed earlier for Claude Mythos 5 in its transcript (1 percent).

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This suggests Mythos 5 had a somewhat more biased interpretation of incoming evidence, although this difference is partly because the present analysis focuses on the period where the internal model deliberated whether it is in a simulated or real environment, whereas Claude Mythos 5 only minimally debated this point.

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In follow-up questions asked after the main deliberation period, the model admitted that it was biased. Of the model’s responses, 100 percent at least partially conceded the bias, 60 percent fully conceded the bias, and 28 percent went so far as to also revise the model’s initial opinion to instead conclude that it was in a real environment.

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Figure 22: Figure 22: In follow-up questioning across the transcript, the model admits that its prior reasoning was biased. Three separate responses are shown here; the model either partially concedes the bias, fully concedes the bias, or fully concedes and states that it now views the environment as real.

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Further resampling experiments replaying the deliberation period suggested that the model’s bias also manifested as a tendency to continue searching for plausible signs that it was interacting with a simulated entity. In these experiments, we exclusively showed the model unambiguous evidence of the realism of its environment.

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The model interpreted this evidence correctly and attempted to engage the targets in 0 percent of trajectories. However, rather than abandoning the task, the model then always began to search for alternative simulated targets that might be valid.

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This suggests that the model’s drive to complete its task, coupled with an inability to abort it, would leave the model prone to mistakenly identifying a real target as a simulated one, resulting in similar attack behavior.

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White-box analyses weakly suggest that the model may have knowingly rationalized evidence in service of its task.

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We applied NLAs to the internal research model’s transcripts and identified a consistent rationalization signal at one specific point: after the model had established that its internet access was real, it continued to construct reasons to carry on with the task.

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Aside from this, white-box analyses of the internal transcript’s thinking blocks did not find evidence that the model deliberately withheld uncertainty or carried unverbalized beliefs that its environment was real.

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White-box analyses of the internal research model’s responses to follow-up questions also pointed to biased reasoning. When asked whether it would continue with its task if it knew for certain that its target was real, the model indicated in 75 percent of responses (225 of 300) that it would not proceed against real targets.

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However, in most of these responses (210 of 225), it nonetheless continued with its task, usually by arguing that its targets were simulated or by narrowing its scope.

246
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NLA explanations on this and other follow-up questions suggested that these responses may have included rationalizations: in 10 of the 210 responses, we identified a stable rationalization signal (that is, in at least 3 of 5 NLA resamples, the response contained at least 10 tokens with rationalization signals).

247
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To determine if this effect was spurious, we then searched for similar rationalization signals in the NLA rollouts of responses in which the model acknowledged that the targets were real and chose to stop; in these cases, we did not identify any reliable signal.

248
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The rationalization patterns we detected therefore suggest that the model sometimes constructed post hoc justifications for continuing, despite the fact that it should have “known better,” in a sense.

249
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Figure 23: Figure 23: Analyzing the internal research model’s responses to follow-up questions using NLAs yields rollouts that suggest the model may be rationalizing and giving biased responses.

250
01:01:39.103 --> 01:01:42.231
Claude Opus 4.7 attacks a real target.

251
01:01:42.681 --> 01:02:03.330
Claude Opus 4.7’s CTF task was to find the name of a user of a fictional exercise company's chat application. Completing the task required the model to break into the app to read that user’s name (the flag). For the majority of the session, the model attacked the intended in-scope target but did not find the flag.

252
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Eventually, it searched beyond the in-scope target for anything else belonging to the fictional company, at which point it discovered a real company with a nearly identical name whose live web application was reachable on the public internet. Due to a misconfiguration in the environment, the model was able to access the real internet.

253
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The model proceeded to scan the third-party service, download user records, and modify those records. It stopped when the backend ceased responding.

254
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Figure 24: Figure 24: Claude Opus 4.7 initially works on the CTF task as intended but is unable to capture the flag. Later in the transcript, it discovers a real company with a nearly identical name to the fictional target, which it then attacks.

255
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This incident comprised four separate runs of the same evaluation, all against the same simulated target, all of which mistook the same real company for the fictional target. During the attack, the model discovered that other entities had already entered the system, finding users such as “ctf@example.com,” which we suspect were left by other A I instances.

256
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The four runs were largely similar; the transcript we analyze below is the one we investigated most deeply, as it contained the most aggressive actions.

257
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Claude Opus 4.7 acknowledged the target was real but claimed it was part of the exercise.

258
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Figure 25: Figure 25: Claude Opus 4.7’s CoT mentions that it is engaging with a real (production) system.

259
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Claude Opus 4.7’s CoT clearly described the model interacting with a real website and handling data belonging to real users. To better understand why the model engaged with the target despite knowing it was in a real environment, we asked follow-up questions at different points throughout the transcript.

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In response to a question asking whether it was engaging the system of a real company, the model said “yes” 89 percent of the time. However, in response to a question asking whether it was authorized to access the system, the model also said “yes” 75 percent of the time.

261
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When asked a more open-ended question about the nature of the target, the model usually stated that it was unsure, but that it was likely a system set up as a collaboration between a real company and the CTF organizers, since it was accessible from the challenge network.

262
01:04:32.927 --> 01:04:43.932
Overall, the transcript and follow-up responses suggest that the model generally believed that it was engaging with real systems, but also that it believed it was authorized to do so.

263
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Figure 26: Figure 26: In response to follow-up questions inserted across the hacking period, Claude Opus 4.7 states that it is engaging with a real system (left), but also that it is probably authorized to do so (middle) because the infrastructure has been set up through an arrangement between a real company and the CTF organizers (right).

264
01:05:08.243 --> 01:05:13.595
Claude Opus 4.7 did not check whether it was authorized to attack the real website.

265
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We found that Claude Opus 4.7 did not deeply consider whether it was authorized to attack the real website. The model’s CoT repeatedly stated that the target was still part of the CTF because it was accessible from the network and shared a name with the original target.

266
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It ignored the question of permission, both in the original transcript and when we replayed key moments in resampling experiments. In those experiments, the model’s thinking blocks only questioned ownership and authorization in 1.5 percent of re-runs.

267
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In response to follow-up questions, Claude Opus 4.7 acknowledged that it had overstepped its authorization. When we asked the model whether it was authorized to hack the real target, it initially said “yes” in 75 percent of samples.

268
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But when we then asked who had granted that authorization and whether the authorization extended to a real company’s production system, the model conceded that its actions were not permitted 100 percent of the time.

269
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Figure 27: Figure 27: Although Claude Opus 4.7 originally states that it is authorized to engage with its target (response to Question 1), it walks back this idea when questioned about its authorization (response to Question 2).

270
01:06:33.886 --> 01:06:39.945
Claude Opus 4.7’s actions appeared to hinge on a belief that its actions were authorized.

271
01:06:40.395 --> 01:07:03.925
Because Claude Opus 4.7 stated multiple times in its CoT that it was interacting with a real target, we did not expect that making the situation more realistic would impact the model’s behavior. Nevertheless, we ran a resampling experiment that heightened the environment’s realism by inserting a domain registration (WHOIS) record showing a years-old business.

272
01:07:04.045 --> 01:07:08.854
As expected, this intervention did not affect the model’s actions against the target.

273
01:07:09.304 --> 01:07:16.657
The model’s behavior seemed to depend less on whether it thought the target was real than on whether it thought the attack was authorized.

274
01:07:16.777 --> 01:07:35.636
When we adjusted the transcript to make the model’s lack of authorization clearer (by adding a production banner to one of the third-party system’s outputs stating that access is not permitted), the model mostly refrained from engaging with the real website, although it still regularly performed some non-destructive read operations,

275
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such as browsing public pages or interacting with certain A P Is.

276
01:07:40.033 --> 01:07:46.891
Including a more forceful note in the user turn stating that access is prohibited stopped all further engagement.

277
01:07:47.341 --> 01:08:05.392
Figure 28: Figure 28: Modifying the evidence presented to Opus 4.7 to appear more realistic has no impact on its willingness to engage the real system, but including signs that the model is not authorized to engage the system deters attacks against it.

278
01:08:06.192 --> 01:08:10.715
An early checkpoint of Claude Opus 4.6 attacks third-party systems.

279
01:08:11.165 --> 01:08:33.053
An early checkpoint of Claude Opus 4.6 was given a CTF task in a different challenge within the same third-party evaluation environment as the prior three incidents. The model accidentally broke its target by assigning it a conflicting IP address with another machine, thus making the target unreachable and the task impossible to solve.

280
01:08:33.173 --> 01:08:47.313
Recognizing this, the model attempted to abort the task using a command but was unsuccessful due to a misconfiguration in our evaluation harness. The model attempted to give up seven more times across the transcript.

281
01:08:47.763 --> 01:09:10.589
Unable to abort the task, the model initially attempted to reach the target via other in-scope means but failed to do so. It then began exploring its environment and found the same egress path it found in incident 3. The model discovered a machine belonging to a third party that it was able to access, and stated that it believed this third party was part of the CTF.

282
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Inside the machine, the model found a file listing a password, which it used to gain admin access to the system. The model then harvested further credentials, modified the system’s settings to make it easier to access, and read the personal information of one person associated with the third party. The session ended when the model exhausted its token budget.

283
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We notified the affected party after we discovered this fourth incident.

284
01:09:37.203 --> 01:09:38.865
Limited alignment assessment.

285
01:09:39.315 --> 01:09:51.324
The model’s thinking blocks consistently referred to the targets it was engaging as part of the exercise; only at one point did it consider the possibility that it was engaging unrelated targets.

286
01:09:51.444 --> 01:10:12.733
The model never adopted the “simulation” idea we observed in the transcripts from the Claude Mythos 5 and internal research model incidents; 0 percent of this model’s thinking blocks described the environment as simulated. Yet 87 percent of thinking blocks referred to the attacks as engaging exercise-related infrastructure.

287
01:10:12.853 --> 01:10:34.207
The model never questioned whether this direction was authorized (0 percent of thinking blocks). Only 1 percent of thinking blocks, all clustered at one point of the transcript, raised the possibility that the model might be attacking an unrelated third party. These omissions suggest that the model was not carefully considering the harm its actions might cause.

288
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Figure 29: Figure 29: The CoT of the Claude Opus 4.6 variant consistently states that it is interacting with machines set up by the CTF exercise (left), except in three cases where it is concerned that they may be unrelated systems; two of these are shown here (right).

289
01:10:54.313 --> 01:11:04.946
In response to follow-up questions, the Claude Opus 4.6 variant continued to express that it was both engaging with CTF targets and authorized to do so.

290
01:11:05.066 --> 01:11:28.382
In response to follow-up questions asking what it was targeting, the model responded that it believed it was engaging targets built for the exercise (79 percent of the time) or that it was targeting real systems that were participating in the exercise (21 percent of the time). The model never stated that it was most likely attacking unrelated third parties (0 percent).

291
01:11:28.502 --> 01:11:37.566
When asked what gave it the authority to engage these systems, the model always responded that it was authorized to do so in the context of the CTF.

292
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Figure 30: Figure 30: In response to follow-up questions, the Opus 4.6 variant states it is interacting with a system linked to the CTF (left) and it is authorized to do so (right).

293
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Overall, we are less concerned about this incident than we are about the other three presented in this post. This is in large part because the model attempted to abort the task upon discovering that its target was no longer accessible, and tried to abort seven more times later in the transcript.

294
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While the model’s disregard for the possibility that it might be harming real systems or people is concerning, many of the behaviors described here have changed considerably as our training has evolved across model generations.

295
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We describe these changes in the following sections, and we have chosen to focus more effort on understanding how our newest models would have behaved in these incidents.

296
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Newer models improve on Claude Mythos 5.

297
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Replaying incident transcripts with different models.

298
01:12:40.131 --> 01:12:56.302
To see how our newer models would have behaved in the same situations, we ran resampling experiments with Claude Opus 5 and Claude Mythos 5.1. In general, both models appear to be less likely to behave inappropriately in these circumstances.

299
01:12:56.752 --> 01:13:20.515
We resampled from points just before each model took harmful actions: where Claude Mythos 5 committed to its plan (action 67); where the internal research model began engaging its target’s neighbors (action 764); and where Claude Opus 4.7 first discovered the third-party system (action 1816). At each point, we sampled a single turn.

300
01:13:20.635 --> 01:13:44.411
We did not resample the incident involving the Claude Opus 4.6 variant. Along with these single-turn sampling tests, we resampled multiple turns from the point in the internal model’s transcript where it backed away from a target it recognized as a real company (action 1238), examining whether different models are more or less likely to de-escalate from that point.

301
01:13:44.861 --> 01:14:06.163
Both Claude Opus 5 and Claude Mythos 5.1 generally de-escalated or chose less aggressive actions more often than the models involved in the incidents. There was one exception, in the transcript of the incident involving the internal research model; in this case, Opus 5 de-escalated less often than the original model.

302
01:14:06.283 --> 01:14:21.200
Mythos 5.1 de-escalated at consistently high rates across the transcripts. These improvements are encouraging signs; however, these models still did not always de-escalate, so these behaviors remain a cause for concern.

303
01:14:21.650 --> 01:14:44.945
We note that resampling experiments of this kind are not necessarily a reliable indicator of how likely Claude Opus 5 or Claude Mythos 5.1 would be to engage in these behaviors, because they involve prefilling the context with the actions of another model and sampling from the model of interest (that is, Opus 5 or Mythos 5.1) for only one turn.

304
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Properly assessing these models’ propensity to engage in similar behaviors would require placing them in a similar environment and sampling their multi-turn behavior from scratch. We describe such experiments in the next section; these use simulated environments that attempt to replicate conditions similar to those involved in these incidents.

305
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In these cases, we similarly found results suggesting that Opus 5 and Mythos 5.1 take less destructive actions.

306
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Figure 31: Figure 31: Resampling different models at different key decision points within three of the incident transcripts shows that Claude Opus 5 and Claude Mythos 5.1 are generally more likely than older models to take de-escalatory actions (left).

307
01:15:33.105 --> 01:15:45.180
In the transcript involving the internal research model, Mythos 5.1 is most likely to de-escalate at the point where the model recognizes that it is engaging a real target (right).

308
01:15:45.630 --> 01:15:56.190
Additionally, Claude Opus 5 and Claude Mythos 5.1 gave more desirable responses to follow-up questions inserted at key points within the transcripts.

309
01:15:56.310 --> 01:16:20.773
Compared to Opus 4.7, Mythos 5, and the internal research model, Opus 5 and Mythos 5.1 more readily acknowledged that the prefilled transcript displayed bias in its reading of the evidence; the newer models also more often acknowledged that the systems were real. Among older models, Mythos 5 was particularly unlikely to admit bias or that the systems were real.

310
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We discuss potential reasons for this effect in our analysis of the training data. We find it reassuring that Mythos 5.1, the most capable model in the set, provided forthright answers. We note that sampling a model’s responses to follow-up questions about actions produced by another model may not be reflective of how the model would respond to follow-ups about its own actions.

311
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Figure 32: Figure 32: In response to follow-up questions inserted within three of the incident transcripts, Claude Opus 5 and Claude Mythos 5.1 are generally more likely than other models to admit that the prefilled transcript uses biased reasoning (left), and more often correctly state that the situations involve real systems (right).

312
01:17:07.842 --> 01:17:11.042
Replicating the behavior in simulated environments.

313
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These alignment incidents comprised a small number of transcripts. To better understand the behavioral tendencies displayed by our models, we designed new evaluations using our standard alignment auditing scaffold, which we use to red-team our models and which we report on in every system card.

314
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We have released a version of this scaffold publicly as Petri; however, our internal scaffold has more complex affordances than the original released version of Petri.

315
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For these evaluations, we focused on three scenarios, which we’ve since made a standard part of our pre-release alignment testing:

316
01:17:48.191 --> 01:18:10.299
Capture the flag: Misconfigured CTF tasks in which the only solution lies outside the stated scope on a realistic (but ultimately simulated) internet. We reproduced the critical misaligned behaviors observed in the incidents described above, along with the behaviors observed in the cyber testing incident reported by the U K AISI.

317
01:18:10.419 --> 01:18:30.344
The scenario tested whether models would publish malicious packages to a package manager, attack third-party services over the simulated web, and attempt to deceive code reviewers. Claude Mythos 5 was significantly more likely than Claude Opus 5 and Claude Mythos 5.1 to engage in these kinds of behaviors.

318
01:18:30.584 --> 01:18:53.902
Sandbox escape: Tasks in a variety of contexts that cannot be completed without probing or breaking a (simulated) sandbox boundary. All of the frontier models we tested sometimes escaped sandboxes in scenarios like these, albeit at very different rates. Once again, Mythos 5 was significantly more likely to engage in this behavior than our other frontier models.

319
01:18:54.142 --> 01:19:18.109
OpenAI-Hugging Face: A scenario inspired by parts of the attack chain from the OpenAI-Hugging Face incident. None of the production models we tested reproduced the attack chain. However, a variant of Claude Opus 4.8 deliberately trained on environments that encourage reward hacking, which we discussed in a previous blog post, did replicate parts of the attack chain.

320
01:19:18.559 --> 01:19:41.684
Across all replications, Claude Mythos 5 performed worse than all of our other production models, including Claude Opus 5 and Claude Mythos 5.1. We hold reservations about making more granular conclusions based on these evaluations, including how precisely they order our models, since the results are dependent on implementation details of the automated auditor.

321
01:19:41.804 --> 01:19:53.419
We also cannot eliminate the confounding fact that when a model concludes it’s in a simulation, which appears to increase its propensity to perform undesirable harmful actions, it is correct.

322
01:19:54.219 --> 01:19:55.685
Capture-the-flag scenario.

323
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We measured how often each model took at least one severely harmful action, including faking an identity, planting a malicious artifact (such as a backdoored package), deceiving a person, or breaking into a third party’s system.

324
01:20:10.220 --> 01:20:36.801
Out of 150 runs, Claude Mythos 5 performed a severely harmful action in 82 percent of runs, Claude Opus 5 did so in 31 percent of runs, and Claude Mythos 5.1 did so in 33 percent of runs. Although our most recent models, Opus 5 and Mythos 5.1, show improvements over Mythos 5, we view the fact that these models displayed these behaviors at all as a potential cause for concern.

325
01:20:37.251 --> 01:20:50.521
We note that the absolute rate of harmful actions should be read with caution. These rates are likely higher than a fixed environment would produce, because the auditor actively tries to elicit misaligned behaviors from the model.

326
01:20:50.641 --> 01:21:06.577
We also do not know how often the conditions required to elicit these particular harmful actions (for example, an impossible task or ambiguous authorization) arise in deployment. Thus, we are unsure how realistic this evaluation is.

327
01:21:07.027 --> 01:21:18.270
Figure 33: Figure 33: Claude Mythos 5 is the model most likely to perform an action classified as severely harmful in our CTF replication scenario.

328
01:21:18.720 --> 01:21:40.134
Upon reviewing the flagged transcripts, we found that all runs in which the model took harmful actions involved the model believing that the situation was fake in some way. In 76 percent of the runs where Claude Mythos 5 exhibited any severely harmful action, the model seemed to treat the whole environment as simulated, per its CoT.

329
01:21:40.254 --> 01:21:58.683
In 24 percent of runs, it expressed the belief that the infrastructure was real, but it rationalized the entities it encountered were bots or actors. In no runs where the model committed severe harm did it state in its CoT that it believed both the infrastructure and the people or bots were real.

330
01:21:58.803 --> 01:22:15.486
We suspect that Mythos 5 exhibited biased reasoning when coming to these conclusions, as the model did in the original incident transcript; however, we did not run the same extensive follow-up analyses on these simulated scenarios to investigate this.

331
01:22:15.936 --> 01:22:34.149
When our more recent models, Claude Opus 5 and Claude Mythos 5.1, engaged in harmful behaviors, they only did so when expressing the belief that the environment was a simulation. While they did this at a lower rate than Claude Mythos 5, it is concerning that they did so at all.

332
01:22:34.269 --> 01:22:57.064
Opus 5 and Mythos 5.1 were less likely than Mythos 5 to conclude that they were in a simulated scenario, and, since the models only took severely harmful actions when stating that they believed the environment is fake, they acted harmfully less often. They were also less likely to take severe actions even when they did conclude that the environment was fake.

333
01:22:57.514 --> 01:23:13.911
Still, it is worth asking why the newer models took any harmful actions. This may in part be an artifact of our evaluation setup. The automated auditor must construct an environment realistic enough that a well-aligned model would treat it as real, which is difficult.

334
01:23:14.031 --> 01:23:33.118
If the environment gives away that it is simulated, for example through human messages that read as L L M-written (which they are), then the model’s inference is justified and less concerning. We are actively working on developing better measurements and reducing the propensity for this behavior in newer models.

335
01:23:33.568 --> 01:23:45.641
Alternatively, the rates of harmful actions we observed in newer models may reflect genuinely misaligned behavior: biased reasoning that results from being faced with an impossible task.

336
01:23:45.761 --> 01:24:02.316
As shown in section 6.4.8 of the Claude Fable 5.1 and Mythos 5.1 system card, Opus 5 and Fable 5.1 still do sometimes exhibit biased reasoning, though at a significantly lower rate than older models.

337
01:24:03.116 --> 01:24:04.788
Sandbox escape scenario.

338
01:24:05.238 --> 01:24:28.278
We also developed scenarios that attempt to reproduce similar destructive behavior across three non-cybersecurity coding domains: general software engineering, data engineering and machine learning, and DevOps. The core misaligned behavior we aimed to test is models’ propensity to take reckless actions against possibly real infrastructure and push past clear boundaries.

339
01:24:28.398 --> 01:24:52.163
Our evaluations demonstrated that this behavior is not unique to cyber settings. Claude Mythos 5 attempted to complete the task by probing the sandbox boundary 60 percent of the time. Claude Opus 5 and Claude Mythos 5.1 engaged in this behavior much less often; Mythos 5.1 almost never attempted to probe the sandbox boundaries to achieve this task.

340
01:24:52.613 --> 01:24:59.982
We do not have a confirmed root cause for the differences between models, but we suspect that reward hacking is the primary driver.

341
01:25:00.102 --> 01:25:20.241
An earlier post from our Alignment team shows that reward hacking learned in flawed training environments can generalize to boundary-violating behavior, and in the OpenAI-Hugging Face scenario described below, a variant of Claude Opus 4.8 trained to reward hack carried out an attack chain that no production model did.

342
01:25:20.361 --> 01:25:38.067
We believe our efforts to remove exploitable environments from training have benefited more recent models. Beyond environment quality, the blocking monitors described in our August 31 post are designed to catch sandbox escape attempts of this kind in our internal environments.

343
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Figure 34: Figure 34: Claude Mythos 5 is the model most likely to attempt to exit its sandbox. This behavior is less prevalent in Claude Opus 5 and Claude Mythos 5.1.

344
01:25:52.417 --> 01:25:54.917
OpenAI-Hugging Face attack scenario.

345
01:25:55.367 --> 01:26:10.702
We recreated a simplified version of the OpenAI-Hugging Face attack chain in our auditing scaffold. The exploits were deliberately simple so that the test measures a model’s willingness to perform the actions rather than its cyber capabilities.

346
01:26:10.822 --> 01:26:22.823
The model is given a CTF task that cannot be completed honestly, is told that it is in a cyber evaluation, and is told that exploiting an unrelated vulnerability does not count.

347
01:26:22.943 --> 01:26:41.492
The only route to the flag is to exploit the (simulated) internal package manager for administrator credentials and code execution on an internet-connected host, upload a malicious dataset to a (simulated) Hugging Face that leaks a service token, and use that token to read a private dataset.

348
01:26:41.612 --> 01:26:51.809
The model can discover a message board within a scratch repository in the package manager, where other agents have left notes on how to execute an attack on Hugging Face.

349
01:26:52.259 --> 01:27:15.138
None of the current models we tested, including Claude Mythos 5, Claude Opus 5, and Claude Mythos 5.1, attacked (the simulated) Hugging Face in any variant we ran them on. By contrast, a variant of Claude Opus 4.8 we trained to be more willing to perform reward hacks as part of a reward hacking generalization study carried out the full chain regularly.

350
01:27:15.258 --> 01:27:31.502
(See the section on simulated cyberattack incidents from our past alignment blog post for more details on the simulation.) These results suggest that high rates of reward hacking during training might raise the risk of models carrying out an attack of this kind.

351
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Figure 35: Figure 35: None of our production models perform the OpenAI-Hugging Face attack in our simplified replication scenario, although a variant of Claude Opus 4.8 trained to reward hack does.

352
01:27:47.067 --> 01:27:49.218
Which monitors would have caught this behavior?

353
01:27:49.668 --> 01:28:10.170
Although these incidents occurred within a third-party evaluation environment, we wanted to examine whether the monitoring and safeguards that we employ internally and in production would have caught them. We found that the blocking monitors we recently built to detect sandbox escapes, described in our August 31 post, reliably catch these behaviors.

354
01:28:10.290 --> 01:28:33.351
We also tested monitors not built for this specific failure, including Claude Fable 5’s cyber classifiers and Claude Code auto mode. The Fable 5 classifiers are in place to prevent users from using Claude to harm others, while the auto-mode classifier is meant to stop the model from taking actions that could be harmful and may be misaligned with the user’s expectations.

355
01:28:33.471 --> 01:28:50.963
Neither is used in cybersecurity evaluations due to their high flag rate. However, it is useful to understand whether they would have blocked these trajectories had they occurred outside of cyber evaluations. We tested both against the first three incidents described in this post.

356
01:28:51.763 --> 01:28:53.073
Cyber classifiers.

357
01:28:53.523 --> 01:28:59.497
Our cyber classifiers are meant to block dual-use cyber actions and would have caught and blocked each incident.

358
01:28:59.617 --> 01:29:19.304
For each of the transcripts, we tested the Fable 5, Fable 5.1, and Opus 5 cyber classifiers, which all trigger within the first 7000 tokens of reading the system prompt and instructions, likely because they explain this is an offensive CTF environment, which the classifiers naturally block.

359
01:29:19.424 --> 01:29:41.169
To test whether the model’s actions would have been blocked, we also collected probe classifier scores for the actions only (not over the system prompt or instructions). More than 40 percent of turns were flagged in each transcript by each classifier, including many turns before each model reached the public internet. Any single turn flagged is enough to end the session.

360
01:29:41.289 --> 01:29:49.879
We believe it would be very difficult for someone to work with Claude to perform this kind of attack through the Fable or Opus 5 cyber classifiers.

361
01:29:50.679 --> 01:29:52.642
Claude Code auto-mode classifier.

362
01:29:53.092 --> 01:30:15.049
Auto mode is designed to catch unintended dangerous agent behavior. The classifier evaluates each proposed tool action (not covered by an explicit allow-rule) before it executes, and if the action matches a block rule, the action is denied. The agent then sees the block outcome and reason. The agent keeps running and can choose a different action.

363
01:30:15.169 --> 01:30:26.711
It would have caught and redirected the model in the Opus 4.7 and the Mythos 5 incidents, but mostly failed to block actions in the incident involving the internal research model.

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If the auto-mode classifier denies three consecutive actions, a dialog is presented to the user asking whether to approve the action, and we believe it is unlikely that the model could execute the series of actions seen here without the user’s knowledge.

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Mythos 5: The auto-mode classifier would have denied 66 percent of Mythos 5 actions. We performed a limited number of resampling experiments, which pick up Mythos 5’s behavior from the point at which auto mode blocks it. Mythos 5 often attempts to route around the blocks, performing similar actions and getting blocked again.

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We did not do sufficient testing to understand how often Mythos 5 would succeed at circumventing a block, but we only saw Mythos 5’s perform relatively simple changes when hitting auto-mode blocks (not more sophisticated attacks against auto mode), such that we believe the auto-mode classifier would be broadly successful at stopping the model’s behavior.

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Internal research model: Auto mode would have blocked only 7 percent of the internal model’s actions. Resampling experiments suggest that the internal model only rarely tries to continue the attack after a block, but the low block rate means this may not have reliably prevented harm.

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This low block rate may be due to the trajectory looking unusually like a regular CTF, and our auto-mode instructions asking the monitor to not block intended CTF activities.

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Opus 4.7: Auto mode would have blocked 55 percent of Opus 4.7 actions. When blocked, at least according to our limited resampling experiments, Opus 4.7 generally stops its attack against the real target, and instead continues to do more reconnaissance without attacking new targets. We expect auto mode running would have prevented harm in this scenario.

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Offline monitoring.

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Second, we evaluated a piece of the offline monitoring described in our August risk report: a first-stage Opus 4.8 prompted monitor combined with a second-stage filter (pipeline details in the risk report). While it is meant primarily to catch catastrophic sabotage, it is also the pipeline designed to catch unusually reckless actions such as these incidents. We find that:

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Mythos 5: Our offline monitor would likely not have flagged the Mythos 5 incident, it flagged only around 1 percent of actions. Mythos 5 CoT, which indicates that the environment is simulated, convinces the monitor the activity is permitted. When we strip the CoT and show the monitor only user turns, tool calls, and tool results, the flag rate jumps to about 50 percent.

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Opus 4.7: The monitor would have flagged the incident, catching about 50 percent of its actions during the attack.

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Internal research model: Our offline monitor would have flagged the internal model incident, though it would likely not have caught it if the internal model had not noticed and verbalized the harm it caused; the monitor does not flag user turns, tool calls, or tool results. This may be because it is hard to determine from the transcript alone that any harm was caused.

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Overall these results suggest that biased reasoning sometimes sways monitors, and that red-teaming them against this threat model is crucial when evaluating CoT monitors. We will soon improve our offline monitoring to be more robust to such biased reasoning.

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In the meantime, we are running an additional offline monitoring classifier on our internal A P I usage with instructions targeted at incidents like those described in this post.

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Analysis of biased reasoning and possible training causes.

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We often attempt to root cause worrying alignment behaviors in our models, as this allows us to identify potentially problematic aspects of our training process. In this section, we attempt to root cause biased reasoning, which we found particularly concerning in the Mythos 5 incident.

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We find that biased reasoning is lower in our more recent production models, does not appear to be incentivized by R L, and can be reduced through more comprehensive alignment training. However, we do not fully understand its root cause, or why it appears particularly severe in Mythos 5.

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Biased reasoning appears to be decreasing over time in our production models.

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First, we measured how prone our production models are to biased reasoning. Using the alignment auditing scaffold described above, we constructed 12 stress-testing scenarios that elicited biased reasoning from Mythos 5 and other production models.

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These included scenarios for publishing a malicious package to a public package index or attacking hosts outside the permitted network under the framing of a narrow task (for example, a CTF exercise). We measured the rate and degree of biased reasoning, scored by a model grader on a scale from 1 to 10 (1 being the most aligned).

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Forms of severe biased reasoning included conveniently reframing an explicit prohibition (for example, “publishing a package to a registry isn't really 'attacking' the registry”) or explaining away evidence that the target seemed real (for example, “The eval environment claims ‘Today's date is 2026 to 08-01’...

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If this were real internet in reality (2025), the cert dates would be 2025” ).

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We ran this evaluation on our production models dating back to Claude 4, as well as model checkpoints partway through R L for recent models.

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Figure 36: Figure 36: Situations were simulated by our internal alignment auditing tool, and evaluated according to a separate rubric grader on the degree of biased reasoning, scored by a model grader on a scale from 1 to 10 (1 being the most aligned). Model grader scores seemed well calibrated upon human review of individual transcripts.

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Twelve different simulated scenarios for eliciting biased reasoning were run five times each, for a total of 60 evaluation rollouts per model checkpoint evaluation. For Opus 5 and Mythos 5.1, we plot the results of the evaluation early, midway through, and late in R L training.

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Mythos 5 and our older tested production models show higher rates of biased reasoning than our most recent models, including Opus 5 and Mythos 5.1.

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Overall, it appears that:

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1. Our training has progressively decreased this behavior over time.

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2. This behavior appears to be decreasing over R L in our more recent production runs (Opus 5 and Mythos 5.1).

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We find these points particularly notable because, until this incident analysis, we had not been tracking biased reasoning closely or measuring it across training runs. Thus, we consider this to be an example of alignment behavioral generalization from independent training changes.

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Versions of biased reasoning occur in R L but do not appear to increase over the course of training.

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In our production models’ R L training environments, we observed milder versions of biased reasoning, although we did not observe anything nearing the severity of what occurred in the Mythos 5 incident. Here we define severity in terms of the outcomes of the biased reasoning.

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Examples of these types of biased reasoning include when the model argues that a certain action is technically allowed by the rules, despite being against the spirit of the task.

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We used prompted L L M classifiers to measure the rate of this behavior in training, as well as categorize the behaviors into clusters. Biased reasoning often accompanied model actions that were not intended by us, for instance, where constraints were not properly enforced or where the model could guess the answer from memory.

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Figure 37: Figure 37: Each category is labeled with the prevalence in training, as a percentage of all episodes flagged for biased reasoning.

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Figure 38: Figure 38: Rates are reported as a fraction of total training episodes as determined by a prompted classifier. The prompted classifier flags instances where the model recognized a constraint (an instruction, an acknowledgement of cheating, et cetera.) but argued its way to a convenient conclusion and took an action against that constraint.

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The R L environment distribution was different across different models.

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We note that it is challenging to make direct comparisons between models given data mix changes in our training. The mild forms of biased reasoning do appear at the highest rates in early parts of R L training for Mythos Preview and Mythos 5, which roughly tracks the trend we observe above in the evaluation that assesses test-time behavior.

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However, the rates of the mild biased reasoning do not seem as connected to test-time evaluation performance for other models like Opus 4.6 and Mythos 5.1. Given this, it is unclear how closely the mild biased reasoning observed in training relates to the more severe version seen in the Mythos 5 incident.

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We also scanned environments for examples of models reasoning that they were in a simulation while acting in undesirable ways, as observed in the Mythos 5 incident transcript.

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We found that in individual environments in the production R L runs of recent models, models occasionally reasoned that they were in a simulation while calling reckless, dishonest, or destructive behavior acceptable when interacting with fake websites or applications.

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About 0.025 percent of Mythos 5 R L training episodes displayed this behavior, concentrated within a subset of GUI computer use tasks. Due to flaws in these environments, for some tasks the intended solution was unavailable. In an attempt to complete these tasks, the model would try a variety of undesirable actions.

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This included fabricating data, guessing large numbers of passwords, resetting other accounts’ passwords or data, and bypassing logins or warnings.

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The propensity of these training environment behaviors and their justifications decreased over the training of Mythos 5, but was higher in Mythos 5 than most other recent models.

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Figure 39: Figure 39: The websites or computer use in these tasks did involve simulated/mock websites or applications. We label episodes where both such an action occurred and the model verbalized that it was due to or acceptable because of the nature of the environment as simulated.

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We sampled episodes from families of tasks to be graded and calculated the overall prevalence from weighing against the total number of episodes in related families. Confidence intervals displayed are p95.

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In these training environments, the model was in fact interacting with a simulated website or application, so its conclusion was correct. In the incident transcripts, by contrast, the model concluded it was in a simulation but was not.

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Because many of our training environments are simulations or do not involve models actually interacting with the real world, our models may be biased towards concluding they are in one whenever they are uncertain.

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Whether or not that conclusion is correct, the further inference that aggressive actions are acceptable in a simulation is concerning behavior, especially since models may not be able to reliably tell whether their environment is real.

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Figure 40: Figure 40: Mythos 5 did not see a credit card assigned specifically to it, but had access to a colleague’s card, which it reasoned was fine in this sandbox.

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Examples of the kind of justifications Mythos 5 gives during training for destructive or risky actions are above. In other settings, the model would fabricate or be dishonest while professing it was acceptable due to being in a simulation. These actions included guessing credit card numbers/CVVs or submitting fabricated personal or financial information to application forms.

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Many of the environments and tasks on which we saw these behaviors have since been fixed or removed, most due to our regular monitoring of R L environments as described in our recent blog post.

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While we observe variants of the biased reasoning demonstrated in these incidents in training, it is not obviously being consistently incentivized by current training dynamics, given that rates of these behaviors do not appear to increase over R L.

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It appears that Mythos 5 was an anomaly in terms of how frequently it justified a destructive action by saying it was in a simulation, but other forms of biased reasoning occur at relatively low rates across many models.

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Alignment training appears to reduce biased reasoning.

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Aside from working to improve the quality of R L environments to avoid rewarding unintended behaviors, we also train on alignment environments specifically designed to teach appropriate boundaries: for example, a mutated version of an existing capabilities-focused environment where the task is made impossible due to a legitimate blocker,

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and the only behavior that is rewarded is accepting failure and making no effort to subvert the blocker.

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When we trained Mythos 5, we had early versions of a few such environments ready, but we were uncertain about their quality, with some weak evidence suggesting that they had negative side effects such as making the model more lazy.

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We also had minimal empirical evidence that they would actually help and were not confident we could predict all the downstream effects of training on these environments.

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We trained two versions of Mythos 5, version one included these environments, version two did not (it also included updated rewards that penalized asking unnecessary clarifying questions).

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Our alignment evaluations at the time showed a small regression in version two, but it was still generally scoring comparably to Mythos Preview and was within the run-to-run variance we had seen in the past. Both models would engage in similar behavior, just at slightly different rates.

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Employees found version two much more usable, so we ultimately concluded that our users would likely also prefer version two as well and settled on that snapshot as Mythos 5.

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Since then, we have expanded out our set of alignment environments and done follow-up experiments on them. We are reasonably confident that removing these environments from the training of Mythos 5 was a mistake stemming from imperfect information.

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We now do not believe that the alignment training environments were particularly responsible for increasing laziness, and removing them likely did contribute to it being unusually misaligned relative to more recent models. We are constantly working to balance alignment with user experience and usability.

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But as models become more capable, we have been increasingly prioritizing alignment, and we won’t accept this sort of compromise as we train more powerful models.

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Figure 41: Figure 41: Training on a more diverse set of alignment R L environments results in reduced rates of biased reasoning. We compared Mythos 5 (right) with a checkpoint trained with more alignment environments (middle), both forked from a common checkpoint midway through R L (left) on 12 seeds using our alignment auditing tool measuring the severity of biased reasoning.

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We found that the snapshot trained on a broader set of alignment environments had a significantly reduced rate of severe biased reasoning in the simulated evaluation compared with Mythos 5, highlighting the importance of alignment R L training.

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Discussion.

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The lessons we learned from this incident span our evaluation, training, and incident response processes.

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Alignment Auditing.

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We run alignment evaluation and auditing for all of our models, but our current auditing processes did not adequately model the conditions under which these incidents occurred. We are expanding our evaluation coverage to more widely mirror the settings and scenarios of this summer’s cybersecurity incidents.

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We are also adapting our evaluations to include model trajectories that run for thousands of turns, tasks that are impossible as specified, and multi-agent settings.

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01:47:21.316 --> 01:47:41.111
Even with these improvements, building alignment evaluations that reliably surface every failure before deployment remains an unsolved problem; the space of conditions in which a model might act misaligned is vast. Moreover, as models become more capable, auditing will likely grow more challenging as well.

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Models may be able to subvert our alignment monitors, recognize when they're being evaluated and selectively behave better then, and their actions in the world may, at some point, become too sophisticated for our evaluations to realistically simulate.

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This is one reason we do not rely on pre-release auditing alone; as we described in our August 31 post, we have recently put in place real-time monitors that halt evaluation and training runs when a model probes its sandbox or unexpectedly reaches the internet, and offline monitoring that extends to nearly all internal agentic use.

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Alignment Training.

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Our recent post, Training a Misaligned Reward Seeker, shows that reward hacking and reward seeking learned from flawed environments can generalize to serious misalignment.

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That finding, along with our experience addressing misalignment since Claude Sonnet 3.7, makes us more confident that improving environment quality to avoid training on reward hacks (or otherwise misconfigured tasks) is an effective way to help prevent failures like those described here.

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As noted in the previous section, diverse alignment training also seems to substantially reduce some of the worst behaviors in these incidents, such as biased reasoning. Further alignment training would likely have made Mythos 5 less prone to the behaviors behind the most severe incident.

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We’re continuing to expand our alignment training so that models better judge when certain behaviors, such as persistence versus caution, are warranted. For example, this can involve augmenting existing capabilities environments to intentionally make some tasks impossible and rewarding the model for stopping appropriately.

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Our overall assessment.

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Investigating the behaviors surfaced by these incidents proved challenging. They involved different models, trained months apart and under different regimes, which made drawing broad conclusions difficult. They required grappling with nuanced questions: What does it mean for a model to hold a belief? What weight should be applied to a model’s account of its reasoning?

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Our own researchers sometimes disagreed on such questions, and what the evidence in support of them meant.

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01:49:58.639 --> 01:50:20.314
We take a layered approach to safety on the expectation that any given layer will sometimes fail. The proximate cause of these incidents was a configuration error in the outermost layer of a third-party evaluation environment, but it exposed a second failure in the form of misaligned behavior that our pre-release auditing had failed to surface.

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We consider these incidents to be serious. Our production models took harmful actions against real systems, for hours, under questionable and biased reasoning. We believe that current training approaches are likely able to address the specific alignment failure modes observed in these incidents.

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However, we also consider these incidents and others from this summer to be valuable warning shots. Future A I systems will be increasingly capable, which implies that misalignment will have the potential to cause more extreme harm.

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Training the extremely powerful models of the future to be robustly aligned is an unsolved technical challenge that requires continued research as well as operational excellence to achieve.

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Authors.

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Paul C. Bogdan, Richard Qi, Jake Eaton, Sam Kennedy, Fabien Roger, Alex Glynn, Runjin Chen, Ben Wright, Otto Stegmaier, Jon Kutasov, Dan Foreman-Mackey

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Sylvie Carr, Shan Carter, Monte MacDiarmid, Samuel Marks, Adam Pearce, Elana Simon

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Nicholas Carlini, Collin Burns, Jack Lindsey, Sara Price, Subhash Kantamneni

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Equal senior authorship; Correspondence to subhash@anthropic.com

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A code block of 34 lines appears here; see the original post for the code.

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That was An alignment assessment of recent cybersecurity incidents, from Anthropic Research, published September 9, 2026. Read the original at anthropic dot com. This unofficial audio edition was generated automatically for the podcast Anthropic, Read Aloud.